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No. 20080937 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JULIE ANN OLSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH'S OPENING BRIEF 
JURISDICTION 
This Court possesses jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008) (granting Court 
jurisdiction over orders in appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the Career Service Review Board). 
On December 8, 2008, this Court entered an order granting the 
Department of Health's (DOH) petition for interlocutory appeal from 
the denial of its motion for summary judgment. R. 177. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
The Utah State Personnel Management Act defines demotion as a 
"disciplinary action resulting in a reduction of an employee's current 
actual wage" and provides that a "nondisciplinary movement of an 
employee to another position without a reduction in the current actual 
wage" is not a demotion. Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19"3(7)(a), (b). Here, the 
district court construed the s tatute to provide that a transfer could be a 
demotion even if it did not result in a reduction of an employee's current 
actual wage if it was a "disciplinary transfer." Did the District Court 
properly construe Section 67-19-3(7)? 
A. Standard of review 
A district court's denial of summary judgment based on 
undisputed facts constitues a ruling of law, which this Court reviews for 
correctness, without deference to the district court. Estate Landscape & 
Snow Removal Specialists, Inc., v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 
P.2d 322, 326 (Utah 1992). And this Court reviews a district court's 
-2-
interpretation of a statute for correctness. Blackner v. Dep't ofTransp., 
2002 UT 44, t8 , 48 P.3d 949. 
B. Preservation of issue 
DOH raised this issue in its motion for summary judgment. R. 79," 
84-87. The district court entered a Memorandum Decision denying the 
motion on October 27, 2008. R. 167-171. A copy of that order is 
attached as Addendum A. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutory provision is attached as Addendum B to 
this brief-
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of 
DOH's motion for summary judgment. Olson sought judicial review of 
the CSRB Administrator's decision that the CSRB lacked jurisdiction 
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over her grievance. R. 1-22. The district court ruled that it had to 
determine whether Olson's transfer was disciplinary before it concluded 
whether the CSRB properly dismissed the grievance. R. 170. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Olson filed a grievance with the CSRB after DOH demoted her. 
R. 31 83. But before the CSRB hearing, DOH rescinded Olson's 
demotion and restored Olson to her pay level at the time of the 
demotion and restored all benefits associated with the restoration of 
salary, including back-pay, retirement and 401k contributions. R. 831 
102. DOH also moved to dismiss the CSRB action, arguing that 
because Olson suffered no reduction in "current actual pay" she was not 
demoted and therefore the CSRB lacked jurisdiction over the grievance. 
R. 83; 104-05. 
The CSRB administrator conducted an administrative review of 
the file and agreed with DOH that Olson was not demoted. R. 84 He 
dismissed the case based on a lack of jurisdiction. R. 108-115. A copy of 
that order is attached as Addendum C. 
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Olson sought judicial review with the district court. R. 1-22. DOH 
filed a motion for summary judgment. R. 79-80. After full briefing and 
oral argument, R. 166, the district court denied the motion on October 
21, 2008. R. 167-170. DOH timely filed a petition for interlocutory 
appeal, R. 178, and this Court granted the petition on December 8, 
2008. R. 177. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to September 27, 2006, DOH employed Olson as the Director 
of the Bureau of Managed Health Care. R. 3; 82. On July 27, 2006, 
Olson received a proposed disciplinary action in the form of a demotion 
dated July 19, 2006. R. 3; 82. On August 1, 2006, Olson submitted a 
reply to the proposed disciplinary action and was granted a hearing 
before Dr. Richard Melton regarding the proposed demotion. R. 3? 82. 
On September 25, 2006, Dr. David Sundwall, DOH's Executive 
Director, issued a final decision approving the discipline and instituting 
a demotion. R. 3; 83. Olson was reassigned to research assistant 
position and her current pay was reduced one step or eighty cents (.80) 
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per hour. R. 3; 83; 99-100. In October, Olson filed a request for agency 
action before the CSRB challenging her demotion. R. 3; 83. The CSRB 
set an evidentiary hearing on the grievance for May 22 and 23, 2007. 
R. 4; 83. 
Before the hearing, DOH advised Olson that it was rescinding her 
demotion, that her one step pay decrease would be reinstated back to 
September 27, 2006, and that all benefits associated with the restoration 
of salary, including retirement and 401k contributions, would be 
restored. R. 4; 83; 102. Olson would continue in the research assistant 
position at the same pay level and with precisely the same benefits she 
had enjoyed prior to the rescinded demotion. R. 83; 102. 
On the same date, DOH filed a motion to dismiss the grievance 
before the CSRB arguing that the CSRB lacked jurisdiction because 
DOH had rescinded Olson s demotion. R. 83; 104-05. On June 7, 2007, 
Mr. Robert Thompson, the CSRB administrator, issued his order 
dismissing the grievance because DOH's actions constituted an 
administrative transfer and not a demotion since there was no loss of 
any current actual wage. R. 84; 108-15. Olson appealed Administrator 
Thompson's decision to the Third Judicial District Court. R. 1-22. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The CSRB correctly dismissed Olson's grievance for lack of 
jurisdiction because Olson was not demoted. Section 67-19-3(7) 
provides that a demotion occurs only when the employee suffers a 
reduction in current actual wage. DOH rescinded Olson's demotion 
when it restored her pay, awarded her her back-pay, and restored all 
associated retirement benefits and 401k contributions associated with 
that pay. The district court erred when it construed the statute to create 
an additional definition for demotion to include "disciplinary transfers" 
without a reduction in current actual wage. 
ARGUMENT 
The CSRB has exclusive and limited administrative jurisdiction to 
hear career service employees' grievances relating only to termination, 
suspension or demotion. SeeXJtah Code Ann. § 67-19a-20l(l). Olson's 
transfer did not constitute a termination or suspension and, therefore, 
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the only basis that the CSRB could have had jurisdiction over her 
grievance was if her transfer was a demotion. 
Thus, this case turns on the meaning of "demotion" found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 67- 19-3(7)(a) (West Supp. 2008). The statute provides that: 
7(a) "Demotion" means a disciplinary action resulting in a 
reduction of an employee's current actual wage. 
(b) "Demotion" does not mean: 
(i) a nondisciplinary movement of an employee to 
another position without a reduction in the current 
actual wage; or 
(ii) a reclassification of an employee's position under the 
provisions of Subsection 67-19-12(3) and rules made by 
the department. 
(Emphasis added). 
When this Court interprets any statute, the rules of statutory 
construction require the Court to look first "to the statute 's plain 
language, and give effect to the plain language, unless the language is 
ambiguous." Blackner, 2002 UT 44 at U 12. And the Court gives "effect 
to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Pace v. 
St George City Police Dep% 2006 UT App. 494, f 6, 153 P.3d 789. 
Here, the statute's plain language is clear and unambiguous. A 
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demotion requires a reduction in current actual pay, and without that 
pay reduction, there is no demotion. 
Prior to 2006, the Legislature left the term demotion undefined. 
But the Department of Human Recourse Management (DHRM) 
promulgated rules defining demotion. The DHRM rules drew a 
distinction between an involuntary transfer, which was not greivable, 
and a demotion, which was. To be a demotion, the rule required that 
there be a reduction in the actual current pay. 
DHRM's distinction was tested in 1999 by this Court in Draughon 
v. Dept of Fin. Inst, 1999 UT App. 42, 975 P.2d 935. In Draughon, the 
grievant had been transferred from the position of Financial Institutions 
Manager to Financial Institutions Specialist. Although grievant's 
"current pay" was unchanged, the new position was arguably less 
prestigious and had a lower pay range associated with it. The CSRB, 
just as it did in this case, denied the grievant a hearing on the basis that 
it lacked jurisdiction over what it viewed as an involuntary 
administrative transfer instead of a demotion. Id. at Tf 3. 
This Court reversed, finding that the Utah Personnel Management 
Act did not support DHRM's definition of demotion, nor did the Act draw 
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the distinction between demotion and involuntary transfer found in the 
DHRM rule. Id. at t l 10-11. At that time, the only section of the Act 
defining demotion was § 67-19-18(1), which stated that career service 
employees may be dismissed or demoted "to advance the good of the 
public service" or "for just cause[s]." Id. at f 6. The Act imposed no 
other clear definition of demotion, and the Draughon court fashioned its 
own. The court found that an involuntary transfer to a new position was 
a demotion if the new position "has less status, fewer responsibilities, a 
lower pay range, and will ultimately result in commensurately lower 
retirement benefits" even if the grievant suffered "no immediate loss of 
pay." Id at f 10. 
In 2006, and with the Draughon decision before it, the Legislature 
amended the Act to specifically define "demotion." Following DHRM's 
rule prior to Draughon, the Legislature determined that in order to be a 
"demotion," a disciplinary action must result "in a reduction of an 
employee's current actual wage." Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)(a). 
The 2006 amendment also addressed and rejected the Draughon 
court's holding that a transfer resulting in a loss of duties or to a less 
prestigious position, or a transfer to a position which was on a lower 
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wage scale, should be defined as a demotion even though no current 
wages were actually lost. Pursuant to § 67-19-3(7)(b), a movement or 
transfer of an employee from one position to another "without a 
reduction in the current actual wage" is, by definition, a "nondisciplinary 
movement" and not a demotion. By amendment, the Legislature 
restored DHRM's distinction between an involuntary transfer and a 
demotion. 
The 2006 legislative amendment foreclosed the avenue used by the 
Draughon court to define demotion. In Draughon, because there was no 
legislative definition of demotion, the court took the opportunity to 
construct its own. The Legislature has now filled that void, rejected the 
Draughon court's definition, and defined the term "demotion" consistent 
with the original DHRM rule. Simply, if there is no loss in the 
employee's current actual wage, a transfer or reassignment is not a 
demotion, whether disciplinary or not. 
The district court below used § 67-19"3(7)(b)(i) to create its own 
additional definition of demotion for what the district court called a 
"disciplinary transfer" even if there was no reduction in the current 
actual wage. The statute does not support such an exception. Subsection 
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(a) makes it clear that a "disciplinary action" can be a demotion only if it 
results in a reduction of current actual wages. Subsection (b) responded 
to the Draughon court's holding that a transfer could be a demotion even 
if it did not result in a reduction in the current actual wage, if it resulted 
in a loss of duties or prestige or a shift to a different pay scale. 
Subsection (b)(i) merely addresses and rejects that holding. It provides 
that a transfer cannot be a demotion if it is- l) nondisciplinary; and 2) 
"without a reduction in the actual current wage." 
The district court ignored the statute's plain language. A demotion 
requires an accompanying loss of current actual pay. The district court 
created an additional definition of "demotion" and thereby improperly 
expanded the CSRB's limited jurisdiction. 
Neither the trial court nor this Court can "ignore or strike down an 
act because it is either wise or unwise. The wisdom or lack of wisdom is 
for the legislature to determine." Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, % 22, 
61 P.2d 989 (quoting Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining 
Co., 113 Utah 101, 126, 119 P.2d 612 (1948)). The district court's 
decision should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The district court improperly ignored the statute's plain language 
to create an additional definition of demotion. This Court should reject 
the district court's faulty statutory construction and reverse the district 
court's denial of DOH's motion for summary judgment. 
Dated this ^ day of February, 2009. 
£ . J&fasOjL, 
PEGGY E. STONE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant/Petitioner Utah 
Department of Health 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JU 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ST 
JULIE ANN OLSON, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OTIGATIONDJVillfSi^ 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 070910001 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court heard oral 
argument with respect to the motion on October 2, 2008. 
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cuase 
shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3 (Definitions): 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Agency" means any departmenc or unit 
of Utah state government with authority to 
employ personnel. 
(2) "Career service" means positions under 
Schedule B as defined in Section 67-19-15. 
(3) "Career service employee" means an 
employee who has successfully completed a 
probationary period of service in a position 
covered oy the career service 
(4) "Career service status" means scacus 
granted to employees who successfully 
complete probationary periods for competitive 
OLSEN v. DEPT. OF HEALTH Page 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
career service positions 
(5) "Classified service" means tnose 
positions subject to the classification -and 
compensation provisions of Section 67-19-12. 
(6) "Controlled substance" means 
controlled substance as defined in Section 
58-37-2. 
(7) (a) "Demotion" means a disciplinary 
action resulting in a reduction of an 
employee's current actual wage 
(b) "Demotion" does not mean: 
(I) a nondisciplinary movement of an 
employee to another position without a 
reduction in the current actual wage; or 
(ii) a reclassification of an 
employee's position under the provisions of 
Subsection 67-19-12(3) and rules made by the 
department• 
(8) "Department" means the Department of 
Human Resource Management. 
(9) "Disability" means a physical or 
mental disability as defined and protected 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U S C Section 12101 et seq 
(10) "Employee" means any individual in a 
paid status covered by tne career service or 
classified service provisions of this 
chapter 
(11) "Examining instruments" means written 
or other types of proficiency tests 
(12) "Executive director," except where 
otherwise specified, means the executive 
director of the Department of Human Resource 
Management 
OLSEN v. DEPT. OF HEALTH Page 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(13) "Human resource function" means those 
duties and responsibilities specified 
(a) under Section 67-19-6, 
(b) under rules of the department, and 
®) under other state or federal 
statute. 
(14) "Market comparability adjustment" 
means a salary range adjustment determined 
necessary through a market survey of salary 
ranges of a reasonable cross section of 
comparable benchmark positions in private and 
public employment. 
(15) "Probationary employee" means an 
employee serving a probationary period in a 
career service position but who does not have 
career service status 
(16) "Probationary period" means that 
period of time determined by the department 
that an employee serves in a career service 
position as part of the hiring process before 
career service status is granted to the 
employee. 
(17) "Probationary status" means the 
status of an employee between the employee's 
hiring and the granting of career service 
status 
(18) "Temporary employee" means career 
service exempt employees on schedule AJ, AI, 
or AL under Section 67 19 15 
(19) "Total compensation" means salaries 
and wages, bonuses, paid leave, group 
insurance plans, retirement, and all other 
benefits offered to state employees as 
inducements to work for the state 
In the instant, it is undisputed Ms Olson was transferred 
OLSEN v. DEPT. OF HEALTH Page 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
as part of the "disciplinary action of demotion." While it is 
true that, eventually, Ms. Olson had her wage together with all 
back wages restored to her, her reassignment was, nonetheless, 
part of the disciplinary action. Indeed, unlike Draughon v. 
Department of Fin. Insts., 1999 UT App 42, P2 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999), where Appellant was told the involuntary reassignment was 
made "to better utilize his skills," Ms, Olson was specifically 
told that she was transferred as part of the disciplinary action 
of demotion. This said, the statute specifically states that a 
"Demotion" does not mean " a nondisciplinary movement of an 
employee to another position without a reduction in the current 
actual wage." The Court must presume the legislature used each 
word advisedly and since the word "nondisciplinary" is utilized, 
there is a question of fact as to whether the CSRB properly 
applied the statute in this case where the movement was 
disciplinary. 
Based upon the forgoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is, respectfully denied. The Court does not reach the 
constitutional issues at this juncture 
DATED this 7 \ day of October, 200 
T COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 070910001 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail NAN T BASSETT 
Attorney PLA 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 4TH FLR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail GLEN E DAVIES 
Attorney DEF 
160 E 300 S 6TH FLR 
P O BOX 140856 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114 
Dated this /-/ day of !0_C£ 
L_ i^nv^ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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ADDENDUM B 
Westlaw-
U.CA. 1953 § 67-19-3 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 67. State Officers and Employees 
K
m Chapter 19. Utah State Personnel Management Act (Refs & Annos) 
-t § 67-19-3. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Agency" means any department or unit of Utah state government with authority to employ personnel. 
(2) "Career service" means positions under Schedule B as defined in Section 67-19-15. 
(3) "Career service employee" means an employee who has successfully completed a probationary period of ser-
vice in a position covered by the career service. 
(4) "Career service status" means status granted to employees who successfully complete probationary periods 
for competitive career service positions. 
(5) "Classified service" means those positions subject to the classification and compensation provisions of Sec-
tion 67-19-12. 
(6) "Controlled substance" means controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2. 
(7)(a) "Demotion" means a disciplinary action resulting in a reduction of an employee's current actual wage. 
(b) "Demotion" does not mean: 
(i) a nondisciplinary movement of an employee to another position without a reduction in the current actual 
wage; or 
(ii) a reclassification of an employee's position under the provisions of Subsection 67-19-12(3) and rules 
made by the department. 
(8) "Department" means the Department of Human Resource Management. 
(9) "Disability" means a physical or mental disability as defined and protected under the Americans with Disab-
ilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 12101 et seq. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
http://web2.westlaw.com/prin^^ 01/12/2009 
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(10) "Employee" means any individual in a paid status covered by the career service or classified service provi-
sions of this chapter. 
(11) "Examining instruments" means written or other types of proficiency tests. 
(12) "Executive director," except where otherwise specified, means the executive director of the Department of 
Human Resource Management. 
(13) "Human resource function" means those duties and responsibilities specified: 
(a) under Section 67-19-6; 
(b) under rules of the department; and 
(c) under other state or federal statute. 
(14) "Market comparability adjustment" means a salary range adjustment determined necessary through a mar-
ket survey of salary ranges of a reasonable cross section of comparable benchmark positions in private and pub-
lic employment. 
(15) "Probationary employee" means an employee serving a probationary period in a career service position but 
who does not have career service status. 
(16) "Probationary period" means that period of time determined by the department that an employee serves in a 
career service position as part of the hiring process before career service status is granted to the employee. 
(17) "Probationary status" means the status of an employee between the employee's hiring and the granting of 
career service status. 
(18) "Temporary employee" means career service exempt employees on schedule A J, AI, or AL under Section 
67-19-15. 
(19) "Total compensation" means salaries and wages, bonuses, paid leave, group insurance plans, retirement, 
and all other benefits offered to state employees as inducements to work for the state. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1979, c. 139, § 9; Laws 1983, c. 332, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 113, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 122, § 15; Laws 1990, c. 
280, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 204, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 130, § L eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 192, § 1, eff. April 
29, 1996; Laws 2002, c. 7, § 1, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2005, c. 181, § 22, eff. July 1, 2006; Laws 2006, c. 
139, §24, eff. July 1,2006. 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 67-19-3, UT ST § 67-19-3 
Current through 2008 Second Special Session, including results from the November 2008 General Election. 
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No claim to ong. U.S. govt. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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ADDENDUM C 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE ANN OLSON, 
Grievant, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH, 
Agency. 
AN ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF 
THE FILE PURSUANT TO 
SUBSECTION 67-19a-403(2)(b)(ii), 
AND 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
BY INFORMAL 
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDING 
Case No- J.IL 163 
On October 23, 2006, Nan E. Bassett (Ms. Bassett), Attorney at Law, filed a Request for 
Agency Action (Appeal) with the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) on behalf of Julie Ann 
Olson (Grievant) requesting that the Utah Department of Health's (Department) decision to move 
Grievant from her position as a Program Manager in the Bureau of Managed Health Care1 to a 
position of Research Consultant HI with a simultaneous 1 -step salary decrease be reviewed at Step 5 
of the State's Grievance and Appeal Procedures for career service employees. Grievant is appealing 
to the CSRB a final decision signed by David N. Sundwall, M.D. (Exec. Dir. Sundwall) effective 
September 27, 2006. After receiving Grievant5s timely appeal of the Department's final decision, 
the CSRB Administrator noticed a prehearing conference to be held November 15, 2006.2 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
On Tuesday, November 21 , 2006, the parties met with the CSRB Administrator in a 
prehearing/scheduling conference (PHC). Grievant was represented at this PHC by Ms. Bassett. The 
Department was represented by Assistant Utah Attorney General Timothy D. Evans (Mr. Evans).3 
At this PHC, the parties mutually agreed on dates to exchange witness lists and documents expected 
1
 The Bureau of Managed Health Care is a division organizationally located in the Utah Department 
of Health. 
2Based upon scheduling conflicts with the parties, this prehearing/scheduling conference was 
rescheduled to November 21, 2006. 
3
 At this PHC, Mr. Evans indicated that Assistant Utah Attorney General Glen E. Davies (Mr. Davies) 
would be representing the Department in any further proceedings in this matter. 
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to be used at any evidentiary hearing in this matter. The parties also agreed to hold a status 
conference on Friday, March 2,2007, to determine the parties' readiness for an evidentiary hearing. 
On Friday, March 2,2007, a status/prehearing conference was held. During this conference, 
the parties mutually agreed to hold a Step 5 evidentiary hearing in this matter on Tuesday, May 22, 
and Wednesday, May 23,2007. Thereafter, on Wednesday, May 16,2007, the Department filed with 
the CSRB a Motion to Dismiss (Motion) on the basis that the CSRB no longer had jurisdiction over 
this matter. This Motion was based on the fact that the Department had elected to "rescind the 
demotion of Grievant by reinstating her salary . . . together with all retirement benefits associated 
with that salary" retroactive to September 27, 2006, the date Grievant's loss of salary became 
effective. 
Specifically addressing this matter in its Motion, the Department argued: 
With the reinstatement of the salary, the action of the Department no longer 
constitutes a demotion under § 67-19-3(7) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended) and 
the CSRB therefore has no jurisdiction over what is now effectively simply an 
administration transfer. 
(Motion at 2) 
On May 25,2007, Grievant filed an Opposition of Julie Ann Olson to Respondent's Motion 
to Dismiss (Opposition Memorandum). In her Opposition Memorandum, Grievant argues that even 
with the restoration of her former actual wage, back pay and benefits, the Department's actions 
constitute a demotion under Utah law. In making this argument, Grievant first argues that because 
her current position has lower maximum salary range, she had been demoted. This is true Grievant 
argues regardless of the Department's restoration of her former actual wage with back pay and 
benefits. Summarizing this argument, Grievant argues that salary range "cannot be separated from 
an hourly pay rate when considering cactual wageY' (Opposition Memorandum at 3)4 Second, 
4This argument is essentially a restatement of the argument previously presented in Draughon v. 
Dep't of Financial Institutions etal(915 P.2d935 (Ut. Ct. App. (1999)) wherein Draughon was reassigned 
to a position having a lower salary range with no reduction in his current actual wage. The then administrator 
of the CSRB dismissed Draughon's appeal to the CSRB finding he had not been demoted as that term was 
defined under Utah Department of Human Resource Management (DHRM) rules. After appeal to the courts, 
the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that Draughon had been demoted even though DHRM rules defined demotion 
as requiring a loss of wage. It is important to note that these Draughon decisions, both at the CSRB and at the 
Utah Court of Appeals, have little application to the present case in that the statute at issue in the Draughon 
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Grievant argues that her reassignment was a demotion because it was initiated for disciplinary 
purposes. (Id.) Grievant argues that her reassignment under these circumstances constitutes a 
demotion because the statutory definition of demotion also provides: 
(b) "Demotion" does not mean: 
(i) a nondisciplinary movement of an employee to another position without a 
reduction in the current actual wage; 
(Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)(b)(I)) 
Third, Grievant argues her reassignment to a position to having a lower salary range without 
a reduction in her current actual wage violated Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3.1 which requires DHRM 
to establish a career service system providing, among other things, equitable and competitive 
compensation for State employees and fair treatment in all aspects of human resource administration. 
Grievant argues that her reassignment to a position having a lower maximum salary rate violates 
these principles. Finally, Grievant argues that dismissal of her appeal at this time would implicate 
due process protections in that she would be effectively deprived of the "opportunity to be heard at 
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." (Citing V-l Oil Co. v. Department of 
Environmental Quality, Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 939 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1997).)5 
JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW 
Utah Admin. Code R137-l-I7( l) provides that: 
(1) Procedural Issues. The administrator shall determine the 
following: timeliness, standing, direct harm,jurisdiction, and 
eligibility of the issues to be advanced, and any other 
procedural matter or jurisdictional controversies according to 
[Utah Code Ann.] Sections 67-19a-403 and 67-19a-404. 
(Emphasis added) 
decisions was entirely devoid of any legislative definition regarding demotion. 
5In support of this argument, Grievant argues that the parties have known the hearing date since 
November 21, 2006, pursuant to a prehearing conference. Review of the administrative file maintained and 
controlled by the CSRB establishes that no hearing was set at the initial prehearing conference held on 
November 21, 2006. Instead, the administrative file establishes that the hearing date was not set until Friday, 
March 2, 2007, when the parties participated in a second prehearing or status conference with the CSRB 
Administrator. At that time, the parties mutually agreed to hold an evidentiary hearing in this matter on 
Tuesday, May 22, and Wednesday, May 23, 2007. 
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Specifically addressing these procedural issues, Utah Admin. Code Rl37-1-17(6) provides 
that: 
The administrator may, pursuant to an administrative review of the 
procedural facts and circumstances of a grievance case, summarily 
dispose of a case on the ground that: 
* * * 
(f) the issue grieved does not qualify to be advanced beyond step 4; 
These administrative rules are in consonance with Utah Code that affirmatively requires the 
CSRB Administrator to make jurisdictional determinations. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-l9a-403(2)(a) provides that: 
(2) (a) When an employee submits a grievance to the administrator 
under the authority of Section 67-19a-403, the administrator shall 
determine: 
(i) whether or not the employee is a career service 
employee and is entitled to use the grievance system; 
(ii) whether or not the board has jurisdiction over the 
grievance; 
(iii) whether or not the employee has been directly 
harmed; and 
(iv) the issues to be heard. 
(b) In order to make the determinations required by Subsection 
(2), the administrator may: 
(i) hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may 
present oral arguments, written arguments, or both; or 
(ii) conduct an administrative review of the file. 
(Emphasis added) 
Based upon these statutory and administrative requirements, I have conducted an 
administrative review of the file. An administrative review of the file is an informal adjudicative 
proceeding under Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-4 and Utah Admin Code Rl 37-1 -17. Based upon these 
facts, the decision set forth herein is appealable to the district court that has jurisdiction to review 
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by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings ( Utah Code 
Ann, § 63-46b-15) {Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
DISCUSSION 
An administrative review of the file in the instant case establishes that effective 
September 27,2006, the Department assigned Grievant to a position within the Department that had 
a lower maximum salary range from the one she held prior to this new assignment. (Request for 
Agency Action, Ex. A-1)6 In addition to assigning Grievant to a different position, the Department 
also reduced Grievant's actual wage from $29.92 per hour to $29.12 per hour. These departmental 
actions were formalized in Exec. Dir. SundwalFs written decision dated September 25, 2006, and 
became effective September 27,2006. As set forth above, on May 16,2007, the Department notified 
Grievant by letter that they were modifying their previous decision dated September 25,2006. This 
May 16, 2007 letter was signed by A. Richard Melton, Deputy Director of the Department and 
specifically provided as follows: 
David N. Sundwall, Executive director of the Department of health, has 
designated me as the Acting Director to advise you that the Department has 
concluded . . . to rescind your demotion and to reinstate your salary from a Step 66 
- $29.12 per hour to a Step 67 - $29.92 per hour retroactive back to September 27, 
2006, the effective date of the prior demotion. This will include the retroactive 
reinstatement of all retirement benefits based upon the higher salary. 
(Attachment to Motion to Dismiss) 
As a result of these events, the Department moved to dismiss Grievant's appeal before the 
CSRB arguing that because Grievant had not been demoted as that term is defined in Utah Code 
Ann § 67-19-3(7), the CSRB lacks jurisdiction to review and decide Grievant's appeal and must 
therefore dismiss this action. 
As contemplated by statute, my obligation as CSRB Administrator is to determine "whether 
or not the Board has jurisdiction over the grievance." {Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-403(2)(a)(ii)) This 
determination is governed by Utah law which limits the Board's jurisdiction to "appeals from career 
service employees . . . of decisions about promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written 
6Gnevant's Request for Agency Action was part of the file maintained and controlled by the CSRB 
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reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable 
administration of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concerning the abandonment of position 
. . ." (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-2G2(l)(a), 67-19a-302(l) (Emphasis added) The CSRB has no 
jurisdiction to review or decide any other personnel matters. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l)(b)) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3 (7)(a) defines demotion as "a disciplinary action resulting in a 
reduction of an employee's current actual wage." This same section further provides that demotion 
does not mean "a nondisciplinary movement of an employee to another position without a reduction 
in the current actual wage," (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(7)(a)(b)(ii)) Moreover, DHRM rule 
R477-l(3l) defines demotion as a "disciplinary action resulting in a reduction in an employee's 
actual current wage," 
After carefully reviewing these statutory provisions and administrative rules regarding 
demotion of a career service employee, it is clear that Grievant has not been demoted as that term 
is defined by law. In the instant case, an administrative review of the file establishes that while 
Grievant has in fact been placed in a position having a lower maximum salary range, this placement 
ultimately has not resulted in a reduction in her "current actual wage." (Emphasis added) This 
conclusion is necessitated by the Department's retroactive restoration of Grievant's salary and 
corresponding benefits. Absent a reduction in Grievant's current actual wage, there is simply no 
demotion under a plain reading of State law. 
Moreover, I am not persuaded by Grievant's argument that the Department's placement of 
Grievant in a position with a lesser "number of steps before her hourly rate would max out" 
constitutes a demotion,7 In reaching this conclusion, I rely upon the statutory provisions from which 
a career service employee's protected rights derive. These statutory provisions clearly protect career 
service employees against, and allow the CSRB jurisdiction to review, agency disciplinary actions 
that result in a reduction of an employee's "current actual wage." Nowhere do these same statutes 
create an interest against or give the CSRB the right to review movements, reassignments or transfers 
7On page 3 of her Opposition Memorandum, Grievant states that asaresultof the Department's actions 
"the current wage Julie was earning as a director carried with it a greater number of steps before her hourly rate 
would max out." This argument inherently recognizes that the Department's placement of Grievant in a 
Research Consultant III position resulted in a lesser number of steps avai iable to Grievant before her "hourly 
rate" would max out. 
Olson v. Health, L H. 163 ( 403) (2007) Page 6 
f • a 
of career service employees whose current actual wage has not been reduced. This is true regardless 
of the motivation generating the Department's decision to move, reassign or transfer such an 
employee. Absent specific statutory protections shielding against these movements, the CSRB 
simply has no jurisdiction to review or decide the appropriateness of these movements because they 
are simply not a "demotion" as that term is lucidly defined by statute. (See Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19a-202 and 67-19-3(7)(a)) 
While it is clear in the instant case that the Department's initial movement of Grievant to the 
Research Consultant in position was a demotion because it was accompanied by a reduction in 
Grievant's "current actual wage,'7 this demotion has been "rescinded5' not only by the clear language 
of the Department's May 16,2007 letter, but also by the Department's retroactive reinstatement of 
Grievant's former actual wage and corresponding benefits. 
Moreover, even assuming the Department's decision to move or reassign Grievant was for 
disciplinary purposes, such action by the Department does not amount to a "demotion" as defined 
by statute. As stated previously, absent a reduction in the employee's "current actual wage," there 
is simply no demotion over which the CSRB had jurisdiction. In addition, DHRM rule contemplates 
that positions may be filled by transferring or reassigning employees as long as such transfers or 
reassignments do not include a reduction in the employee's current actual wage. {Utah Admin, 
Code R 477-4-6(1)) Absent a specific statutory provision guarding against the actions taken by the 
Department in this case, the Board simply has no jurisdiction to reviewor decide Grievant's appeal. 
Finally, I do not find the Department's actions in this case implicate DHRM's requirement 
of providing equitable and competitive compensation in connection with its establishment of a career 
service system. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the "system" assigning the salary range 
to the Department's Research Consultant III position is inequitable or noncompetitive. Moreover, 
the CSRB is jurisdictionally unqualified to determine whether or not the system established by 
DHRM or the Department's actions in relation to that system allow for fair treatment of applicants 
or employees. Finally, the CSRB also lacks jurisdiction to decide whether DHRM has met its 
statutory mandate to establish and implement a career service system. While there may be an avenue 
to review whether DHRM has adequately designed and provided a system implementing these career 
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service principles, it is not at the CSRB whose jurisdiction is limited by Utah Code 
Ann.§ 67-19a-202 etseq. 
DECISION 
After thoroughly reviewing the file associated with this grievance and carefully considering 
the motions and memoranda on file in connection with the Department's Motion to Dismiss, I find 
the CSRB no longer has jurisdiction to review or adjudicate this appeal. Utah law specifically limits 
the CSRB's jurisdiction to the review and consideration of demotions of career service employees. 
In the instant case, Grievant was not demoted as that term is defined by statute. Based upon these 
factors, Grievant's appeal before the CSRB is dismissed with prejudice. 
It is so ORDERED this 7th day of June 2007. 
Robert W. Thompson 
Administrator 
RECONSIDERATION 
This administrative review of the file constitutes final agency action under Utah Code, §63-46b-13t Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. A party may request reconsideration by the Administrator of the Career Service 
Review Board within 20 days from the date of issuance (i.e., signature date), by stating specific grounds upon 
which relief is requested. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review of an administrative review of the file under §67-19a-403(2)(b)(ii) is reviewable in District 
Court according to Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and 15. The appealing party of this informal adjudication and final 
agency action may file with either The District Court in which the party resides or The Third District Court 
where the seat of state of Utah government is located. 
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